A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings of their peers leads to lower contributions and earnings compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers even though the feedback format does not a¤ect incentives.
Introduction
The question of how to promote cooperation when private and collective interest are at odds is a recurring theme in economics. The interest in the topic stems from the di¢ culty of …nding mechanisms that will eliminate the incentives to free ride when people are assumed to be self regarding. Recently, however, laboratory experiments have provided convincing evidence that many individuals have other-regarding preferences and are not only willing to cooperate with others, but also to punish free riders even when they cannot expect monetary bene…ts from their actions (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, Villeval, 2003) . The threat of punishment helps discipline free riders and leads to high levels of cooperation. 1 The simplicity of the mechanism and its e¢ cacy in promoting cooperation has attracted a lot of attention amongst economists and other social scientists (see Fehr and Schmidt, 2003) . However, despite multiple studies on the subject, little is known about whether cooperation established under the threat of peer punishment is robust to institutional changes. The main reason is that all studies carried out since the publication of the seminal work by Gächter (2000, 2002) have followed similar experimental protocols and used as a testing ground the public-good game as modi…ed by Fehr and Gächter.
The two-stage game of Gächter (2000, 2002) is as follows. In the …rst stage, each group member is given an endowment that he must divide between a private and a public account. Contributing the whole of the endowment to the private account is a dominant strategy, but contributions to the public account create a positive externality shared equally by all group members. In the second stage, individuals are informed about how much each of their peers contributed to the public account and are given the opportunity to reduce the earnings of any group member at a personal cost. This paper investigates whether the feedback format used in the experiments is important for the e¢ cacy of peer punishment in promoting cooperation and e¢ ciency. A common characteristic of all public good experiments with peer punishment is that in the second stage participants receive feedback about each group member's contribution to the public account. However, experiments in oligopolistic markets have shown that subjects receiving information about the earnings of their peers behave more competitively and tend to be less cooperative than subjects who instead receive information about ei-ther the aggregate group production (Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 1999; or the individual levels of production (O¤erman, Potters and Sonnemans, 2002 ) even though incentives are una¤ected. That is, the way in which the same information is presented a¤ects the likelihood of collusion.
One reason institutional details such as feedback format might a¤ect cooperation is that, under certain conditions, peer punishment transforms the public good game from a social dilemma to a coordination game. Indeed, Fehr and Gächter (2000) write that subjects in their experiment "quickly established a common group standard that did not change over time" (p.992; emphasis in original). Fehr and Schmidt (1999; Proposition 5) formally show that the two-stage game has multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria if a single (su¢ ciently) inequity-averse individual exists. The patterns found in the data are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model. For example, punishments are typically found to increase in severity as the deviation from the group's average contribution increases, while the average group contribution is itself not important in determing the extent of punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007b; Fehr and Gächter, 2000) . In other words, punishments are not harsher when the overall level of contributions to the public account is lower. 2 If peer punishment transforms the public good game to a coordination game as the data suggests, it seems surprising that groups never seem to adopt ine¢ cient contribution standards and instead adopt nearly (or even fully) e¢ cient standards. Van Huyck, Beil (1990, 1991) were the …rst to show that groups repeatedly fail to coordinate at the payo¤ dominant equilibrium in games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. The fact that the severity of punishment is not a¤ected by the group's total contribution to the public account suggests that, apart from the threat of punishment, there must be other factors that promote cooperation. The evidence from oligopolistic experiments discussed above implies that one of these factors might be the feedback format used.
To see how feedback format can a¤ect cooperation consider the examples in Tables  1a and 1b . Each of four players is given an endowment of $20 and must decide how much to contribute to a public account. As the public account generates income for all group members the individual with the lowest contribution (Player 4) is the person with the highest income (and the player who will be most severly punished in period t). Place yourself in the role of Player 4 and try to imagine how much you would contribute in period t + 1 assuming your goal is to contribute as much as Players 1, 2 and 3. Do this separately for Tables 1a and 1b.   Insert Tables 1a and 1b here   The information in Tables 1a and 1b is equivalent (see section 2 ). However, the feedback format seems to highlight di¤erent aspects of the outcome: The feedback about individual contributions (contribution feedback) displayed in Table 1a emphasizes who is cooperating, who is not, and, ultimately, the social bene…t of making contributions to the public account. In contrast, the feedback about individual earnings (earnings feedback) displayed in Table 1b makes salient to all players the private bene…t associated with contributing to the private account. Since players choose their contributions simultaneously, they have to form expectations about the contributions of their peers. It is possible, that the di¤erent emphasis placed on social and private incentives a¤ects expectations. Feedback format might therefore act as a coordination device helping groups select contribution standards. Consequently, subjects in a position similar to that of Player 4 could be more likely to adjust their contribution upwards when receiving contribution feedback rather than earnings feedback. 3 The experiment presented in the following section aims to test whether feedback format can a¤ect coordination, cooperation and e¢ ciency in a public good game with peer punishment. The three treatments di¤er only with respect to the feedback format. In the …rst treatment, similar to previous experiments, individuals receive contribution feedback, while in the second treatment, participants receive only earnings feedback. The information in both treatments is equivalent as there is a clear one-to-one relation between contributions and earnings. Nonetheless, the di¤erent emphasis o¤ered by the feedback format might a¤ect the contribution standards chosen. The third treatment is of particular interest: Individuals receive both contribution and earnings feedback. Given that the two formats stress con ‡icting elements of the decision task individuals should …nd it harder to converge towards a contribution standard.
The results show that feedback format has a signi…cant impact on the e¢ cacy of peer punishment. Contributions are sustained at relatively high levels under contribution feedback. Earnings feedback has a negative impact on contributions. When subjects 3 I asked several economists to take part in this exercise and tell me how much they would contribute in period t + 1 in each scenario. Most replied that they would undoubtedly increase their contribution when faced with Table 1a . However, when faced with Table 1b , most of them responded that they would not increase their contribution as others would most likely lower their contribution or that they would increase their contribution slightly.
receive only earnings feedback cooperation breaks down. In line with the argument that feedback format a¤ects coordination, subjects are found to have di¢ culty in establishing contribution standards when they receive feedback in both formats. This leads to progresively harsher punishments and earnings that are even lower than those predicted by the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental design. Section 3 presents the experimental results. Section 4 discusses alternative explanations for the results. Section 5 concludes.
The Experiment
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Melbourne between February and April 2007. The 124 participants were students from the University of Melbourne recruited randomly using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004 ) from a pool of more than 1000 volunteers. Each subject took part in only one of the three treatments, and none of the subjects had previous experience with economics experiments.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants are seated in partitioned computer terminals and read the same set of instructions regardless of treatment. 4 Each participant must answer ten control questions before the experiment can begin. The questions aim to help participants understand the incentives in the game and how contributions translate to earnings and vice versa. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are randomly divided into groups of four individuals. The same group of individuals plays a …nitely repeated public good game for 10 periods. That is, group composition remains unchanged throughout the experiment. 5 The game consists of two decision stages: the contribution and the punishment stage (referred to as stage 1 and stage 2 in the instructions). At the beginning of each period, each participant is given an endowment of E$20 (experimental dollars). In the …rst stage, players must decide simultaneously and without communication how much of the endowment to contribute to a public account, c i , where 0 c i 20. The rest (20 c i ) remains in the player's own account. In addition to the money that player i keeps, i receives a …xed percentage of the group's total contribution to the public account, 0:4: The earnings of player i at the end of the …rst stage are given by equation (1) which was also used to generate the numbers in Tables 1a and 1b 
At the beginning of the second stage each participant receives detailed feedback about stage one. The format used to provide feedback depends on the treatment. In treatment C individuals receive information about each group member's contribution, c i (contribution feedback), in treatment E individuals receive information about each group member's earnings at the end of stage one, 1 i (earnings feedback), while in treatment CE individuals receive information about each group member's contribution and earnings (see Table 2 ). Equation (1) shows that the di¤erent types of feedback are equivalent: An individual with higher earnings has contributed less to the public account. That is, Table 2 here After participants are informed about the contributions/earnings of each group member subjects have to decide whether they wish to punish any of their group members. To do so they must purchase punishment points. Punishment is costly for the punisher as every point costs E$1. At the same time, each punishment point reduces the earnings of its recipient by E$2. 7 Let p ij denote the number of punishment points that player i assigns to j (where i; j=1, ..., n; j 6 = i). Player i's earnings at the end of the period are accordingly
The maximum number of points a participant can distribute to others is equal to his 6 One could argue that calculating the earnings of each individual using contribution feedback is simpler than calculating the contribution of each group member using earnings feedback. To avoid this confound, at the end of the …rst stage subjects are also informed about the group's total contribution, P 4 h=1 c h , and their earnings up to that point, i : This information simpli…es the calculation of individual contributions using earnings feedback and makes incentives salient in a similar way across treatments. 7 Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) show that there is a monotonic relation between the reduction a punishment point causes and contributions to the public account (and earnings). A reduction E$2 per punishment point was su¢ cient to stabilize contributions at an intermediate level. To permit increases in contributions as well as decreases relative to the basic design a reduction factor of E$2 was used.
earnings from the …rst stage, that is,
, while punishment decisions are made simultaneously and without communication. To make punishments possible, at the beginning of each period subjects are randomly assigned an identi…cation number between 1 and 4 to distinguish their actions from those of the others. To prevent the formation of individual reputation that could lead to counter-punishments and blur incentives, these numbers change across periods.
At the end of each period, participants are informed about the punishment points they received in total, the associated income reduction and their earnings as in (2) . Payo¤ functions (1) and (2), the duration of the experiment (10 periods), and the instructions are common knowledge amongst participants in all treatments. Note also that, as is common in public good experiments with punishment opportunities, each subject is given a one-o¤ lump-sum payment of E$25 to compensate for any losses he or she might incur in the duration of the experiment.
The experimental sessions lasted approximately …fty minutes and the average payment was A$17.80 or roughly $16.40. The exchange rate between experimental and Australian Dollar was E$1 = A$0.085. The experiments were conducted using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007 ).
Results

Punishment behavior
Punishment behavior should be a good indicator of how feedback format a¤ects behavior. As mentioned earlier, a common …nding in public good experiments is that individuals tend to punish those who contribute less than their peers. Therefore, if feedback format serves as a coordination device helping group members establish a contribution standard, punishment behavior should not di¤er in C and E. However, punishment behavior might be di¤erent in CE as subjects might …nd it harder to coordinate their contributions when receiving feedback in two formats that highlight both the private and the social bene…t which are at odds with each other. The following results summarize the e¤ect of feedback format on punishment behavior.
Result 1:
The likelihood that punishment will occur is una¤ected by the feedback format.
Result 2: Punishment severity is the same in C and E, but is signi…cantly higher in CE. Table 3 provide support for Results 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts the likelihood of punishment as a function of how much an individual's contribution deviated from the average contribution of his peers. In all treatments, the likelihood seems to increase with the negative deviation from the contribution of one's peers. There are no apparent di¤erences in the punishment likelihood across treatments. This suggests that the incentives in the game are understood equally well by subjects in all treatments. Figure 2 shows how deviating from the contributions of one's peers a¤ects the severity of punishment conditional on punishment occurring. While there appear to be no di¤erences between treatments C and E, punishments in CE are substantially harsher (especially in the …rst two brackets on the left). The harsher punishments in CE might be due to subjects having di¢ culties in creating common standards for contributions to the public account. This interpretation is supported by the considerably smaller number of observations in the interval [-2, 2] in CE compared to C and E in Figure 1 . Further support is given in Figure 3 which depicts the evolution of punishment severity over the course of the experiment (the numbers in Figure 3 indicate the likelihood of being punished in each period). The severity of punishment is similar across treatments in the …rst period. However, punishment severity appears to progressively increase in CE, while remaining constant in C and E. In the …nal period of the experiment the punishments are more than twice as harsh in CE than in C or E. The temporal pattern of punishment severity in CE suggests an unresolved tension. The source of this tension will become clear in section 3.3. 8 Insert Figure 3 here
Figures 1, 2, and
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here
In support of these observations Table 3 presents the results from a regression analysis. The fact that punishments do not take place in the majority of cases (see Figure  1) requires that one models the decision to punish (punishment decision) separately from the decision of how much to punish (punishment level). The appropriate speci…ca-tion to capture the two-stage process is a hurdle model. The likelihood function of the hurdle model is given by the product of two separate likelihoods. First, the likelihood 8 It is worth emphasizing that the likelihood of punishment is the same across treatments despite the apparent ine¤ectiveness of punishment in raising contributions in some treatments. This is evidence for the fact that punishments are not driven only by strategic considerations, but also by emotions (e.g. that an individual will be punished, which is captured by a standard Probit model, and second, the conditional likelihood that the individual will receive a certain number of punishment points, which is captured using a truncated linear regression. The two parts of the model are estimated separately (McDowell, 2003) . The repeated nature of the experiment requires that one also controls for random e¤ects at the group level.
The independent variables included in the regression are: CE; a dummy variable taking the value of one if the observation comes from CE and zero otherwise; E; a dummy variable for treatment E; (Absolute) Negative Deviation de…ned as maxf0; ( P h6 =j c h;t )=3 c j;t g, where c j;t is the contribution of individual j in period t; Positive Deviation, de…ned as maxf0; c j;t ( P h6 =j c h;t )=3g; Others'Average Contribution, that is, ( P h6 =j c h;t )=3; and P eriod, a variable to control for time e¤ects. For simplicity in exposition, individuals contributing more (less) than their peers on average will be sometimes referred to as high (low) contributors.
Insert Table 3 here
The results in Table 3 support the evidence from Figures 1, 2 , and 3. Starting with the punishment decision, the coe¢ cients of CE and E are insigni…cantly di¤erent from C (the omitted category) at all conventional levels. This implies that the likelihood of being punished does not di¤er signi…cantly across treatments. Similarly to what has been found in previous studies, we see that the higher negative (positive) deviation is, the higher (lower) the likelihood of punishment is. Punishment severity, on the other hand, is signi…cantly higher in CE than in C or E. The greater the extent of free riding (as captured by Absolute Negative Deviation) the harsher the punishment is likely to be. Also, similarly to the results of previous studies that employ a …xed matching protocol, we observe that the average contribution of the other group members a¤ects neither the punishment decision nor the punishment level. 
Contributions to the public account
The fact that the punishment threat is not weakened by the provision of earnings feedback creates ideal conditions for testing the e¤ect feedback format has on contribution levels. If contributions are lower in CE and E than they are in C we will have strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that feedback format a¤ects contributions by emphasizing the private bene…t of free riding. If this hypothesis is correct we should also observe higher contributions in CE than in E due to the lack of emphasis on the social bene…t of contributions in E. The following result summarizes the impact of feedback format on contributions.
Result 3: Earnings feedback has a negative e¤ect on contribution levels, while contribution feedback has a positive e¤ect. The highest contribution levels are observed in C followed by CE and then E. Figure 4 and Table 4 . Figure 4 presents the evolution of average contribution over time in each treatment. Average contribution starts at similar levels across treatments. This is to be expected as subjects receive feedback for the …rst time after the contribution stage of period 1. Any di¤erences, therefore, should be observed from period 2 onwards. Indeed, average contribution remains stable in CE over the duration of the experiment, but increases slightly in C, and declines in E. Table 4 provides statistical support for these observations using a linear regression with group random e¤ects. The …rst model compares average contributions across C, CE, and E. The di¤erences are signi…cant across all treatments (the di¤erence between CE and C is signi…cant at the 10% level). The second regression models separately the di¤erent time trends by introducing interaction terms between Period, CE and E. The insigni…cance of the coe¢ cients of CE and E suggests that there are no di¤erences across treatments at the beginning of the experiment. Somewhat surprisingly, given the upward trend observed in Figure 4 , the coe¢ cient of Period is not signi…cant. The reason for this becomes clear in the third regression that excludes observations from the …nal period. Regression (3) indicates that there is a signi…cant increase in C that was masked in the second regression by a strong end-game e¤ect. The di¤erences between CE and C, and E and C increase in every period as indicated by the negative coe¢ cients of CE*Period and E*Period.
Support for Result 3 comes from
Insert Figure 4 and Table 4 here Result 3 is consistent with the …ndings of Casari and Luini (2005) who use a public good game with punishment opportunities in which subjects receive contribution and earnings feedback. They …nd low and stable levels of contribution to the public account even when peer punishment is permitted. Casari and Luini (2005) , however, neither examine the e¤ect of feedback format nor do they provide an explanation for the low contribution levels observed in their experiment. 10 
Convergence of contributions
If feedback format acts as a coordination device and helps groups establish contribution standards, then providing individuals with information in two di¤erent formats highlighting the con ‡ict between private and collective interest should slow convergence towards a given contribution level. In other words, the standard deviation of contributions should decline more slowly in CE, than in C or E. Indeed, a Wilcoxon test shows that standard deviation declines signi…cantly in the second half of the experiment in C (by 24%, p-value< :1) and in E (by 45%, p-value< :01), but the 16% decline in CE (see Table A1 in the appendix) is not signi…cant (p-value> :3).
11
Result 4: Standard deviation of contributions decreases signi…cantly over time in C and E where feedback is given in only one format, but not in CE where feedback is given in two di¤erent formats.
How exactly does feedback format prevent convergence in CE? The fact that contribution levels di¤er signi…cantly despite similar punishment patterns in all treatments begs the question: How do individuals respond to punishments? This question is important as Figures 1 and 2 suggest that, in all treatments, individuals can reduce the expected loss of income due to punishments by contributing the same amount on average as their peers (or slightly more). 12 Therefore, the way individuals react to punishment should re ‡ect their expectation about what their peers will contribute in the following period.
13
Result 5: Earnings feedback lowers the likelihood that a low contributor will respond to a punishment by raising his contribution in the following period.
In treatment C, 74% of the punishment victims react by increasing their contribution in the following period. This is comparable to the reaction in previous experiments. In sharp contrast, only 56% and 51% of the punished subjects raise their contribution in CE 11 The standard deviation is higher in the second half of the experiment in 4 out of 10 groups in CE, 2 out of 10 in C, and only 1 out of 11 in E. 12 Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) …nd that subjects increase their contribution to the public account following a punishment even if the punishment does not reduce their income. This suggests that punishment has an additional non-monetary cost for the recipient that should be taken into consideration when one considers the cost and bene…t of choosing a particular contribution level. 13 One could pay subjects to state their beliefs about what their peers will contribute on average in the following period. However, this procedure is known to a¤ect behavior in public good experiments (Gächter and Renner, 2006) . Given that the main interest of this study is to examine whether the feedback format is partly responsible for the high contribution levels seen in previous studies I decided against eliciting subjects'beliefs. and E, respectively. This suggests that, while most subjects in C expect the contribution of their peers to be higher in the following period than their contribution in the current period, a large number of subjects punished in CE and E expect the average not to be higher than (or close enough to) their current contribution. In other words, earnings feedback seems to induce a considerable fraction of punished subjects to expect a large drop in contributions.
Insert Table 5a and 5b here
The di¤erent reactions to punishment might be partly a¤ected by the di¤erent trends in group contributions. That is, an individual might not increase her contribution in E as she observes the contribution of her peers to be also decreasing from one period to the next or might choose to increase it in C as group contribution has been increasing. To provide formal statistical support for Result 5, Table 5a presents the results from a Probit regression analysis of how low contributors adjust their contributions between periods. The dependent variable is the likelihood that an individual will increase his contribution in period t + 1 compared to his contribution in period t. In addition to variables explained previously, the independent variables include Other's Average Contribution Change= P h6 =i c h;t P h6 =i c h;t 1 ; Punished, a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a subject was punished and zero otherwise; and the interaction of these variables with treatment dummies. The signi…cance of variable (Absolute) Negative Deviation Punished indicates that low contributors punished in treatment C (the omitted category) are more likely to increase their contributions in the following period than low contributors not punished. This tendency is signi…cantly weaker in treatments CE and E as indicated by the (signi…cant) negative coe¢ cients of CE (Absolute) Negative Deviation
Punished and E (Absolute) Negative Deviation Punished, respectively. Increases in the contributions of the other group members raises the likelihood of an individual increasing his contribution by a similar amount in all treatments. To understand why individuals fail to converge in treatment CE one needs to also consider the behavior of high contributors.
Result 6: High contributors in CE are as likely to lower their contribution in the following period as high contributors in C. High contributors in E are more likely to lower their contribution in the following period than high contributors in C. Table 5b that shows the adjustment in the contribution of high contributors. The negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient of Positive Deviation indicates that the higher an individual's contribution is compared to that of her peers the less likely she is to raise her contribution in the following period (or, equivalently, the more likely she is to lower or leave her contribution unchanged) in treatment C. The most interesting …nding in the second regression is the insigni…cance of the coe¢ cient of CE Positive Deviation and, at the same time, the signi…cance of E Positive Deviation. The latter implies that high contributors in treatment E are less likely to increase their contribution in the following period compared to high contributors in treatment C (similar to the case of low contributors). However, the insigni…cance of the coe¢ cient of CE Positive Deviation implies that high contributors in CE react similarly to high contributors in C. This indicates that high contributors in CE have somewhat di¤erent expectations to low contributors in the same treatment: While high contributors adjust their contributions in a similar way to high contributors in C, low contributors are found to be less likely to increase their contribution than low contributors in C.
Support for Result 6 is presented in
Results 5 and 6 taken together explain why contributions fail to converge in treatment CE: High contributors seem to expect low contributors to adjust their contribution upwards, while low contributors seem to expect high contributors to adjust their contribution downwards. It, therefore, appears as if high contributors focus their attention on the contribution feedback and low contributors on the earnings feedback.
Conjecture:
In treatment CE subjects interpret feedback in a self-serving manner. This tendency hampers convergence of contributions.
The di¤erent reactions of high and low contributors in treatment CE are most likely the reason punishment severity increases dramatically over time in CE (Figure 3) . The ine¤ectiveness of punishment in convincing low contributors to increase their contribution levels presumably leads some high contributors to use the severity of punishment as a signal of their intentions. The continuous increase in punishment severity in CE also suggests that the lack of responsiveness to punishment causes frustration (or anger) to punishers. The latter is supported by the fact that punishments in CE are substantially more severe even in the …nal period.
Earnings across treatments
The use of punishment is costly for groups: First, subjects must pay to punish group members, and, second, punishment victims lose part of their income. For punishment to be bene…cial for the groups, the bene…ts that accrue from its threat and use must outweigh the costs. Most previous studies have found that peer punishment does not lead to increases in earnings and often leads to decreases (for a brief review see Nikiforakis, 2008) .
If all individuals contribute their endowment to the public account and abstain from punishing average earnings are maximized and equal E$32 (see equation 1). On the other hand, if individuals behave as prescribed by the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, then average earnings equal E$20. Feedback format has a strong impact on earnings.
Result 7:
Earnings are signi…cantly lower in treatments CE and E in which subjects receive earnings feedback compared to C in which subjects receive only contribution feedback. Figure 5 provides the relevant support for Result 7. Earnings feedback has clearly a negative e¤ect on earnings. This is due to investments in peer punishment that are at least as costly and lower contribution levels. Most notably, the severe punishments in treatment CE lead to earnings that are even lower than those predicted by the ine¢ cient equilibrium. The average earnings of E$24.20 in C are signi…cantly higher than the average earnings in E (Mann-Whitney, p-value= :016) and CE (Mann-Whitney, p-value< :01).
Insert Figure 5 here At this point, one could argue that groups receiving earnings feedback are not worse o¤ than they would be if peer punishment was totally absent. However, this argument would overlook the fact that individuals voluntarily contribute signi…cant fractions of their endowments even when not threatened by punishment. Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) compare earnings in a treatment similar to C to those in a treatment without peer punishment. Average earnings are E$23.90 in the treatment with punishment (in their paper the treatment is referred to as "2") and E$22.81 in the treatment without peer punishment. This di¤erence was not found to be signi…cant.
Alternative Explanations
The experimental results support the hypothesis that feedback format serves as a coordination device that in ‡uences the level of contributions to the public account by focusing subjects' attention on either collective or private bene…t. Nevertheless, it is worth considering alternative explanations for the experimental …ndings.
The …rst explanation one must consider is that participants do not fully understand the experiment. As a result, earnings feedback help subjects discover their dominant strategy. This does not seem to be the case. Firstly, before the experiment can begin participants must answer ten questions that help them understand the incentives in the game and how contributions translate to earnings and vice versa. Secondly, the postexperimental questionnaire shows that participants understand the game by frequently referring to the need for cooperation and the incentives to free ride. Thirdly, the fact that participants understand the incentives they face is also evinced by their punishment behavior which is similar across treatments and follows patterns seen in previous experiments.
14 This evidence suggests that the di¤erences are not driven by confused subjects.
A second related explanation is that information about earnings allows individuals to imitate the choice of the most successful of their peers. Vega-Redondo (1997) shows that if individuals are boundedly rational then competition in an oligopolistic market will be more …erce if information about earnings is provided. Huck, Normann and Oechssler (1999, 2000) and O¤erman, Potters and Sonnemans (2002) provide evidence in support of Vega-Redondo's model from experimental Cournot oligopolies. 15 The …ndings in this experiment, however, challenge the notion that the impact of earnings feedback is due to boundedly rational individuals. If individuals are boundedly rational (in the sense that they cannot calculate their optimal decision), then they should be unable to imitate the choices of their most successful peers unless they can observe both the choice and the respective earnings. This justi…cation, therefore, fails to explain the di¤erence in contributions in treatments C and E. Furthermore, imitation should be easier in treatment CE where information is readily available. This would imply that standard deviation should decrease in this treatment as all group members imitate the one with the highest earnings. However, as we saw standard deviation does not decrease signi…cantly over time in CE, in contrast to C and E. Imitation cannot account for the harsher punishments that were observed in CE. Therefore, the results from the present experiment add to the existing evidence questioning the empirical signi…cance of imitation in laboratory experiments (see Boesch-Domenech and Vriend, 2003; Apesteguia, Huck, Oechssler and Weidenholzer, 2007) . A third explanation is that feedback format alters the interpretation of punishments. In treatment C it should be clear that punishments are meted out to the least cooperative subjects. This is supported by the fact that most subjects react to punishment by raising their contribution in the following period. In treatments E and CE, however, the person punished is the highest earner -the person who "did best". It is, therefore, possible that punishment is interpreted as a sign of jealousy (or envy) in E and CE, rather than as an "invitation" to cooperate as it is in C. Jealousy would prescribe that a punishment by individual i is followed by a reduction in i's contribution in the following period. As we saw, however, this is not what high contributors (typically the ones meting out punishment points) do in CE. Subjects must have been aware of this from early on. Consider the contributions in period 2 of the subjects that punished other group members in period 1. In C, 68% of the punishers in period 1 (13 out of 19 punishers) did not reduce their contribution to the public account in period 2. Similarly, 64% of the punishers in CE (9 out of 14 punishers) did not reduce their contribution in period 2. The behavior of punishers is similar in treatments C and CE and, therefore, it seems unlikely that the interpretation of punishment changes. (For completeness, only 38% of the punishers -6 out of 16 punishers -in E did not reduce their contribution from period 1 to period 2.) Therefore, the di¤erences across treatments cannot be attributed to feedback format altering the interpretation of punishments.
A fourth explanation is that there is an experimenter's e¤ect in public good games with peer punishment. The feedback format changes subjects'perception about what the experimenter's "preferred" behavior is. In C subjects might be aware that punishment serves to increase contributions. In contrast, in E and CE, the presence of information about earnings might make subjects perceive the game di¤erently (e.g. as a tournament). It seems di¢ cult, however, to reconcile this argument with the fact that punishment behavior follows similar patterns across treaments.
Discussion
This paper presented evidence from a public good experiment showing that cooperation sustained under the threat of peer punishment can be sensitive to changes in institutional details. In particular, changes in the format used to provide subjects with feedback about the actions of their peers lead to signi…cantly di¤erent levels of cooperation and earnings even though they do not a¤ect incentives. Feedback about the earnings of the other group members impacts negatively both cooperation and earnings.
The data suggest that feedback format a¤ects the coordination process. Unlike in the treatments where a single feedback format is used, in the treatment where feedback is given in two formats that emphasize the con ‡icting social and private bene…ts, individual contributions to the public account do not converge. Contribution feedback emphasizes the social bene…t of contributing to the public account, while earnings feedback highlights the private bene…t from contributing to the private account. This explanation di¤ers from those previously given for similar framing e¤ects (e.g. Oechssler, 1999, 2000; O¤erman, Potters and Sonnemans, 2002) . The explanation offered here is most closely related to that in Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt (2006). These authors formally show how framing e¤ects can be explained within a rational choice framework. In particular, Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt show that frames can a¤ect beliefs about the actions of others, which in turn a¤ect the actions subjects take.
The results cast doubt on the common belief that peer punishment can always solve the free rider problem (e.g. Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002) . Di¤erent institutional details such as the feedback format might in ‡uence subjects' expectations in a way that either enhances or undermines the e¢ cacy of peer punishment. Institutional e¤ects are likely to be more pronounced in larger groups where communication is di¢ cult.
Institutional details might also a¤ect the likelihood of con ‡ict escalation. The selfserving interpretation of information in the treatment in which subjects receive feedback in two formats prevented contributions from converging and consequently led to harsher punishments. In a more general setting where reprisals are permitted, harsher punishments are more likely to trigger counter-punishments (Denant-Boemont, 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008) . This, in association with the self-serving interpretation of feedback, might lead to con ‡ict escalation and lower e¢ ciency if multiple rounds of punishment and counter-punishment are allowed (Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2008) .
The negative impact of earnings feedback on cooperation suggests that a reconsideration of some previous experimental …ndings might be desirable. For example, if coordination in the public good game can be improved by omitting information about earnings, one might wonder whether similar (super…cial) changes in institutional details can prevent the well-documented coordination failure in games with multiple Paretoranked equilibria (e.g. Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990;1991). For example, Charness, Fréchette, and Kagel (2004) , show that the use of payo¤ tables leads to less giftexchange compared to a treatment in which subjects are presented only with payo¤ functions. While the gift-exchange game is not a coordination game, payo¤ tables undoubtedly make incentives in the game salient. As subjects in pure-coordination experiments are confronted with payo¤ tables, coordination failure might be less of a problem when payo¤ functions instead of tables are used.
The evidence from the present experiment also emphasizes the need for economists to go beyond the standard assumption that agents have self-regarding preferences. Only then will we be in the position to identify situations in which costless changes in institutional details can improve outcomes. Institutional details might help facilitate cooperation in the presence of peer punishment opportunities and free riding incentives -as in the treatment with contribution feedback -or lead to signi…cant e¢ ciency losses -as in the treatment with contribution and earnings feedback. Punishment decision is a probit with group random effects; Punishment severity is a truncated linear regression with group random effects; Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Probit with group random effects; Standard errors are in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Probit with group random effects; Standard errors are in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
